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NOTES AND COMMENT
Conflict of Laws-Full Faith and Credit.
On June 24, i918 Dart received judgment against McDonald in
Superior Court of Spokane County, Washington.
On February 27, 1924 Dart assigned that judgment and all sums due
thereon to Roche.
In March 1924 the six-year statute of limitation of Washington
having not yet run, Roche brought suit against McDonald in Oregon
upon the Washington judgment. McDonald was personally served
with a summons, appeared and demurred to the complaint. This
demurrer was overruled. He then elected to plead no further and did
not answer the complaint. Subsequently, in October, 1924, more than
six years after the rendition of the Washington judgment, judgment
was rendered against him in default of answer for the amount of the
original judgment with interest.
Shortly thereafter the plaintiff Roche commenced an action in Wash-
ington on the Oregon judgment. McDonald answered denying the
validity of the Oregon judgment under a Washington statute which
provided that after six years from the rendition of any judgment it
should cease to be a charge against him, and no suit should be had
extending its duration or continuing it in force beyond such six years.
McDonald won in Washington because the Washington Court held
the Oregon judgment void because the first Washington judgment had
no validity there since six years had run, when the Oregon judgment
was rendered.
Roche appealed to the Supreme Court of the United States because
of the full faith and credit clause of the Constitution, Section i Arti-
cle 4 which provides, that "full faith and credit shall be given in each
state to the public acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every
other state."
U. S. Supreme Court reversed the decision of the Washington Court.
Held, that the Oregon Court had jurisdiction of the parties and sub-
ject matter. (The suit was started before the Washington six years
had run). Even if Oregon had misconstrued the Washington statute,
McDonald could not thereafter have impeached the validity of the
judgment because nevertheless it is a good judgment in Oregon and
must have full faith in Washington.
The Washington Court in coming to their decision cite Brown v.
Parker, 28 Wis. 21. In that case Brown sued Parker in Illinois on a
Wisconsin contract which was barred by the Wisconsin six-year statute
of limitation. Brown obtained judgment in Illinois by confession upon
warrant of attorney. He then brought suit on the judgment in Wis-
consin. The Wisconsin court held that no greater legal rights, remedies
or effect can be claimed under the judgment in suit here than could be
claimed under a like judgment entered in this state.
This case is distinguishable from Roche v. McDonald insofar as the
Wisconsin six-year statute had already run at the commencement of
that action, while in Roche v. McDonald the six-year Washington
statute had not ,yet run at the commencement of the action in Oregon.
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